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D ata on social representations of world history have been collected everywhere in the world except sub-Saharan Africa. Two studies using open-ended data involving university students from six African
countries fill this gap. In Study 1, nominations from Cape Verde and Mozambique for the most important events
in world history in the past 1000 years were dominated by war and politics, recency effects, and Western-centrism
tempered by African sociocentrism on colonization and independence. The first three findings replicated previous
research conducted in other parts of the world, but the last pattern contrasted sharply with European data. Study
2 employed a novel method asking participants how they would begin the narration of world history, and then to
describe a major transition to the present. Participants most frequently wrote about the evolution of humanity
out of Africa, followed by war and then colonization as a beginning, and then replicated previous findings with
war, colonization, and technology as major transitions to the present. Finally, when asked about how they
foresaw the future, many participants expressed hope for peace and cooperation, especially those facing more risk
of collective violence (Burundi and Congo). A colonial/liberation narrative was more predominant in the data
from former Portuguese colonies (Angola, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau) than from former Belgian colonies
(Burundi and Congo).
Keywords: Collective remembering; Narrative templates; Social representations; Africa.
D es donne´es sur les repre´sentations de l’histoire du monde ont e´te´ recueillies partout dans le monde sauf enAfrique subsaharienne. Deux e´tudes utilisant des questions ouvertes pose´es a` des e´tudiants d’universite´
provenant de six pays africains reme´dient a` cette situation. Dans la premie`re, les re´ponses provenant du Cap-Vert
et du Mozambique en ce qui concerne les e´ve´nements les plus importants de l’histoire mondiale de´montrent une
pre´ponde´rance de la guerre et de la politique, d’effets de re´cence et d’une centration occidentale tempe´re´e par un
sociocentrisme africain se manifestant par des re´ponses sur la colonisation et l’inde´pendance. Les trois premiers
re´sultats sont conformes a` ceux obtenus dans d’autres parties du monde, mais le dernier est fortement en de´calage
avec les donne´es europe´ennes. La deuxie`me e´tude a utilise´ une nouvelle approche demandant aux participants
comment ils commenceraient la narration de l’histoire mondiale avant de poursuivre avec la description d’une
transition majeure menant a` la pe´riode pre´sente. Le plus souvent, les participants pre´sentent l’e´volution de
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l’humanite´ a` partir de l’Afrique suivie de la guerre puis de la colonisation comme commencement avant de
reproduire les donne´es ante´rieures sur la guerre, la colonisation et la technologie en tant que points de transition
majeurs vers la situation pre´sente. Finalement, lorsqu’on leur demande comment ils entrevoient l’avenir,
plusieurs participants expriment leur espoir pour la paix et la coope´ration. Cela est vrai en particulier pour ceux
qui font face plus que les autres a` la violence collective (Burundi et Congo). Une narration centre´e sur la
colonisation et la libe´ration est plus pre´sente dans les donne´es provenant des anciennes colonies portugaises
(Angola, Cap-Vert et Guine´e-Bissau) que dans les anciennes colonies belges (Burundi et Congo).
D atos acerca de las representaciones sociales de la historia del mundo se han recogido en todo el mundosalvo en el A´frica subsahariana. Este vacı´o es llenado por dos estudios que utilizaron datos de respuestas
abiertas y en los que participaron estudiantes universitarios de seis paı´ses africanos. En el Estudio 1, las
respuestas de Cabo Verde y Mozambique de los eventos ma´s importantes en la historia del mundo en los u´ltimos
1000 an˜os estuvieron dominadas por la guerra y la polı´tica, los efectos de lo reciente y el centrismo del mundo
occidental moderado por el sociocentrismo africano respecto de la colonizacio´n y la independencia. Los tres
primeros resultados replican los de investigaciones previas realizadas en otras partes del mundo, pero el u´ltimo
patro´n contrasto´ marcadamente con los datos europeos. El Estudio 2 empleo´ un me´todo novedoso
pregunta´ndoles a los participantes de que´ forma comenzarı´an la narracio´n de la historia del mundo, y luego
pidie´ndoles que describieran una importante transicio´n hacia el presente. Los participantes escribieron con
mayor frecuencia acerca de la evolucio´n de la humanidad desde el A´frica, seguida por las guerras y luego la
colonizacio´n como un comienzo, y luego replicaron hallazgos previos con las guerras, la colonizacio´n y la
tecnologı´a como las transiciones importantes hacia el presente. Por u´ltimo, cuando se les pregunto´ acerca de
co´mo preve´n el futuro, muchos participantes expresaron esperanza en la paz y la cooperacio´n, especialmente
aquellos que se enfrentan a mayor riesgo de violencia colectiva (Burundi y Congo). La narrativa colonial o de
liberacio´n fue ma´s predominante en los datos de las antiguas colonias portuguesas (Angola, Cabo Verde y
Guinea Bissau) que en las antiguas colonias belgas (Burundi y Congo).
Outside of South Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa is
a truly ‘‘dark continent’’ in terms of empirical
research on its political and social psychology.
Africa has been cruelly treated by the world in
terms of its history of colonization by European
powers, its poor record of postcolonization devel-
opment, and in its quasi-absence from social
psychological research. Given that ‘‘History pro-
vides us with narratives that tell us who we are,
where we came from and where we should be
going’’ (Liu & Hilton, 2005, p. 537), representa-
tions of world history should be a fertile domain to
engage in the task of better understanding how
Africans narrate their own story.
Previous studies on social representations
(Moscovici, 1988) of world history have been
conducted all around the world except for sub-
Saharan Africa (Liu et al., 2005, 2009). These
studies have used open-ended (e.g., Deschamps,
Paez & Pennebaker, 2001; Liu et al., 2005, 2009;
Pennebaker, Paez & Deschamps, 2006) and closed-
ended methods (Liu et al., in press). Given the lack
of previous data from Africa we decided to use
open-ended methods to uncover African narratives
in their own right, without restrictions from item
content derived from other regions. Furthermore,
we introduce new open-ended questions in order to
allow investigation not only of the content of
social representations of world history from
Africa, but also of the influence of different
narrative templates (Wertsch, 2002) guided by
three questions. First, will the data from Africa
replicate the general patterns found in previous
research? Second, are there any uniquely African
perspectives on world history? Third, what is the
impact of different narrative cues on the represen-
tations of world history? We also aimed to explore
possible differences according to the countries’
historical context.
COLLECTIVE REMEMBERING OF
WORLD HISTORY
According to Halbwachs (1950/1997), human
memory is not an individual but a social phenom-
enon. People can only remember things that are
mediated by communication in their respective
social groups and what they can accommodate in
their existing social frames of reference. Extending
Halbwachs, Wertsch (2002) considers collective
remembering as ‘‘a form of mediated action,
meaning that it is fundamentally distributed
between active agents, on the one hand, and the
cultural tools – especially narrative texts – that
they employ, on the other’’ (p. 172). Thus, social
representations of history are dynamically orga-
nized through narrative templates (Liu & La´szlo´,
2007; Wertsch, 2002). Narrative templates provide
a tool for what Bartlett termed the ‘‘effort after
meaning’’ (1932, p. 44). Wertsch (2002, p. 123)
AFRICAN REPRESENTATIONS OF WORLD HISTORY 355
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [b
-o
n:
 B
ib
lio
te
ca
 d
o 
co
nh
ec
im
en
to
 o
nl
in
e 
U
M
in
ho
] a
t 0
7:
02
 1
2 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
1 
argues that the efficacy of narrative as a cognitive
instrument is grounded in a moralizing impulse:
Narrative provides a way of grasping together a set
of events and people, not into some kind of neutral
and objective representation; rather, in the creative
‘‘process of invoking an imaginary coherence,
integrity, fullness, and closure, narrative also
introduces a moral order into the picture’’
(Wertsch, 2002, p. 124).
Licata, Klein and Ge´ly (2007) translate such
narrative phenomena into a more psychological
language of identity functions of collective
memory: it contributes to the definition of group
identity; it furnishes elements that can be used to
achieve positive distinctiveness (by processes of
selective remembrance and oblivion); it provides
justifications for groups’ actions (past, present,
and future); and it enables collective mobilization
by challenging the legitimacy and stability of the
existing social order. As we shall see, each of these
elements is reflected in African representations of
world history.
BIASES IN THE REMEMBRANCE OF
WORLD HISTORY
Previous research on the representations of world
history, using open-ended measures, identified the
following biases.
Recency bias
People tend to perceive recent events as more
important than those that occurred long ago (Liu
et al., 2005, 2009; Pennebaker et al., 2006). When
asked about memories of traumatic and vivid
events related to their relatives, people usually
recollect events going only as far back as their
grandparents (Pennebaker, Paez & Rime´, 1997).
Using free-recall measures in the remembrance of
world history, Liu et al. (2009) found that the last
200 years accounted for 80% of events nominated
across different cultures.
Centrality of warfare and politics
Previous free-recall data showed that wars, con-
flicts and revolutions were considered the most
important events, whereas scientific, technological,
and socioeconomic issues were underestimated
(Liu et al., 2005, 2009). According to Liu and
La´szlo´ (2007), conflict seems to be a basic template
for storytelling, generating powerful emotions.
Conflicts and war play a central role in nation
building, being frequently considered the founda-
tional events in a nation’s history.
Western-centric bias
Previous studies on the remembrance of World
history have evidenced a high level of crosscultural
consensus, with important nominated events being
mainly related to Europe and North America.
‘‘Dominant social representations of history
appear to be the representations of dominant
nations and cultures, i.e. Western nations’’ (Liu
et al., 2009, p. 687). Thus, representations of world
history reproduce the current state of world power
relations.
Sociocentric bias
Participants tend to consider nationally relevant
historical events as more important than those that
do not refer to their country (Deschamps et al.,
2001; Liu et al., 2005, 2009). Overall, Western
countries consistently have reported very few
events that occurred outside of their own region,
whereas non-Western countries reported many
events related to Western countries but also
exhibited some ethnocentrism with respect to the
events related to their own state.
We might expect these patterns to be replicated
in sub-Saharan Africa, but some developments
counter these tendencies. During the past few
decades, new African historiography has devel-
oped. One of the priorities of African liberation
movements has been to rewrite history to over-
come Eurocentric perspectives and decolonize
people’s minds (Cabecinhas & Feijo´, 2010). In
Angola, Mozambique, and other African nations,
postindependence interpretations of history (Feijo´,
2009) have emerged denouncing the exploitation of
the colonies as a result of asymmetrical social and
power relations, and present Africa as the cradle of
humanity. Hence, we might expect a more
Afrocentric view to emerge from young African
university-educated elites.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: POLITICAL
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Given the central role that context plays in the
dynamics of collective memory, it is pertinent
to present a short historical overview and describe
the present-day situation of the six sub-Saharan
African countries where this research was
conducted: Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde,
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau,
and Mozambique.
Until the mid-1950s colonialism was still firmly
established in Africa. According to Stengers (1989,
p. 200), in 1956 the colonial order in Belgian
Congo was ‘‘so stable, assured, rock-solid that
political perils were viewed as very unlikely.’’ This
was also the case in Portuguese Africa. Most of the
future liberation leaders (for example, Patrice
Lumumba in Congo and Amı´lcar Cabral in Cape
Verde and Guinea-Bissau) adhered to the colonial
project. However, their faith in the colonial system
started to falter when local elites ‘‘realized that in
spite of the many efforts required for attaining a
higher status, they remained ‘Blacks’ in the eyes of
the Belgians and were still denied social recogni-
tion’’ (Klein & Licata, 2003, p. 576), and
independence was achieved by other African
states (Ghana 1957, Guinea 1958, Senegal 1960,
etc.). Meetings between influential African natio-
nalistic and pan-African leaders led to the creation
of the Organization of African Unity (established
on 25 May 1963, transformed into the African
Union in 2002).
In the language of social identity theory (Tajfel
& Turner, 1979), ‘‘cognitive alternatives’’ to
colonialism emerged in the course of the 1950s
and the European colonizers’ ‘‘position began to
be perceived as illegitimate and unstable and they
became a salient, negatively valued, out-group’’
(Klein & Licata, 2003, p. 587). Congo achieved
rapid independence after three years of negotia-
tions with Belgium in 1960, whereas Burundi
gained its independence in the context of inter-
ethnic violence in 1962, but also without meeting
much resistance (Weinstein & Schrire, 1976). In
contrast, for the former Portuguese African
colonies, independence was obtained only after a
long liberation war that started in Angola in 1961,
spread to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, and
did not conclude until the Carnation Revolution in
Portugal in 1974.
Since independence, these countries, except Cape
Verde, have experienced periods of interethnic
violence or/and civil war, which undermined their
development with devastating consequences.
According to the United Nations Development
Programme (2009), sub-Saharan Africa is the
region in the world with the lowest human
development level. The Democratic Republic of
the Congo is in 176th position of 182 in the Human
Development Index ranking (HDI¼ 0.389);
Burundi appears in 174th position (HDI¼ 0.394),
behind Guinea-Bissau (173: HDI¼ 0.396), and
Mozambique (172: HDI¼ .402). Angola appears
higher up at 143 (HDI¼ 0.564). All of them are
categorized as Low Human Development coun-
tries. Cape Verde is in 121st position (HDI¼ 0.708),
being considered a Medium Human Development
country since 2008.
STUDY 1
In Study 1 we asked participants from two African
countries to free-recall the most important events
in world history in the past 1000 years, as in prior
research (Liu et al., 2009). We had three hypoth-
eses involving the replication of previous findings
in an African context.
H1: Participants would mention more events
related to Europe and North America in compar-
ison to events not involving directly Western
countries (Western-centric bias), but this will be
complemented by a tendency to mention events
linked to ethnic, national, and regional ingroups
(sociocentric bias). We surmised that colonization
issues would be particularly important in the
African context. This affords an African perspec-
tive on world history that puts the blame for
negative effects on an externally imposed past
instead of the failings of the ingroup, which serves
social identity protection functions.
H2: Wars and conflicts would be mentioned more
often than other kinds of events, such as science,
technology, and socioeconomic issues (centrality
of warfare and politics).
H3: Most nominated events would be recent
ones, occurring within the past 100–200 years
(recency bias).
Method
In Cape Verde and Mozambique, a question-
naire—identical to that reported in Liu et al.
(2009)—was administered to university students.
University students are ideal for this kind of study,
as their representations of world history reflect a
strong institutional (educational) component that
allows comparability with data from other parts of
the world.
Procedure
Surveys were administered in university class-
rooms to students in various disciplines, except
history, who participated on a voluntary basis.
Those are nonprobabilistic samples, and cannot be
considered representative of the whole populations
of their respective countries.
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The cover page explained to participants that
we were interested in their personal opinions about
history, rather than their factual knowledge.
Students completed surveys in Portuguese, the
standard language of instruction. Data were
collected in Cape Verde in 2007 and in
Mozambique in 2009.
Participants
Three hundred and one university students
participated in this study: 121 Cape Verdeans (57
women and 64 men; age M¼ 23.19, SD¼ 5.13)
and 180 Mozambicans (99 women and 81 men; age
M¼ 26.59, SD¼ 6.63).
Survey questions
Following Liu et al. (2005), participants were
asked to list the five events they considered to have
been most important in world history in the past
1000 years. No list of events was presented, so
recall was free. The categorization of events
followed protocols established in previous research
(Liu et al., 2005). Participants then had to rate the
evaluation of each event using a seven-point scale,
from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).
Results and discussion
Table 1 displays the Top 10 events spontaneously
listed by Cape Verdeans and Mozambican parti-
cipants when thinking about the most important
events in world history in the past 1000 years.
The most obvious feature of Table 1 is the
prominence of Western-centrism: Events related
to Europe and North America, and global events
where Western nations played a central role,
appear at the top in both countries. In Cape
Verde almost all events in the top 10 occurred in
Western countries or were related to Western
dominance (see Liu et al., 2005, 2009), with only
two exceptions: the abolition of slavery and the
Asian tsunami. In Mozambique, Western-centrism
was evident in more than half of the events, with
the other big cluster of events being related to
colonialism and human rights issues. Hypothesis 1
was confirmed.
In accord with Hypothesis 2, the World Wars
were the most frequently nominated events in
world history. The data replicated Liu et al.’s
(2005, 2009) findings, confirming that history is
also perceived as a story about war and politics in
sub-Saharan Africa. However, these two cate-
gories of events accounted for an average of 56%
of participants’ nominations, which is less than the
75% observed in previous research.
This difference was accounted for by the high
levels of colonization-related nominations in Cape
Verde and Mozambique (19% and 18% respec-
tively, and coded separately from politics and war
in accordance with previous research: This repre-
sented only 2% in Liu et al., 2009). Colonialism
was perceived as very negative and the end of
colonialism as very positive, supporting a more
Afro-centric interpretation of these events.
Slavery issues had greater salience than in most
international data except Brazil (Liu et al., 2009),
which also has a history of slavery. Abolition of
slavery was mentioned by 18% of the Cape
Verdeans and 6% of Mozambicans participants,
and slavery was nominated by 8% of
Mozambicans and 6% of Cape Verdeans. The
abolition of slavery was considered an unambigu-
ously positive event, while slavery was considered
consensually as the most negative event.
The Berlin Conference, which shaped present-
day African country borders according to
European colonial interests of 1884/5, was
TABLE 1
Top 10 events in world history (last 1000 years)
Cape Verde (N¼ 121) % Mean (SD) Mozambique (N¼ 180) % Mean (SD)
WWII 63 1.22 (1.51) WWI 61 2.16 (1.80)
WWI 57 1.70 (1.28) WWII 46 2.20 (1.81)
9/11 World Trade Center (WTC) 41 1.31 (1.03) Industrial Revolution 26 6.78 (0.83)
Industrial Revolution 19 6.42 (1.01) African independence 24 6.76 (0.78)
Abolition of slavery 18 7.00 (0.00) Colonialism 19 2.71 (1.79)
Fall of Berlin Wall 16 1.46 (0.43) 9/11 WTC 18 2.76 (2.62)
Iraq War 14 4.85 (2.07) Obama victory 14 6.58 (1.22)
Asian tsunami 14 1.27 (0.43) French Revolution 13 6.62 (1.29)
End of colonialism 12 6.80 (0.75) Berlin Conference 12 3.30 (2.22)
Cape Verde independence 12 6.56 (0.78) Creation of UN 11 7.00 (0.00)
%¼Percentage of respondents that nominated an event.
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mentioned by 12% of Mozambicans but not by
Cape Verdeans, perhaps because, being an island
archipelago, its borders were not defined by the
conference outcomes.
Events related to the promotion of human rights
and equal opportunities for all were evident in the
top 10 in Mozambique, such as the French
Revolution (13%), the founding of the United
Nations (11%) and Obama’s victory (14%).
Outside of the top 10, events related to apartheid
were also salient in Mozambique: apartheid (8%),
imprisonment and liberation of Nelson Mandela
(respectively, 3% and 4%), end of apartheid (3%).
In sum, a subset of events related with the
promotion of human rights and struggle for
freedom and independence was much more salient
in African data than in Western or Asian data (see
Liu et al., 2005, 2009). The kind of sociocentrism
observed in these African samples was closer to
a pan-African agenda than to a nationalist one,
as participants privileged events related to the
‘‘common fate’’ of suffering and oppression from
colonial rule and the African struggle for freedom,
human rights, and independence.
Finally, there was a strong recency effect
(Hypothesis 3). Most of the nominated events
occurred in the 20th or 21st centuries, and together
the last 200 years accounted for more than 90% of
events nominated on average (compared to 80% in
Liu et al., 2009). This huge recency effect can be
explained by the fact that most Africans have
nearly no knowledge of their precolonial history,
because there was no written material, and also
because the Europeans imposed a Western-centric
view of history, sometimes destroying evidence of
African civilizations (Said, 1985).
Summing up, results from two African samples
confirmed the major previous findings, with
representations of world history being: (1) char-
acterized by Western-centrism complemented by
some sociocentrism (at a national and/or regional
level), (2) a story about war and politics, and (3)
focused on the present and recent past.
Data confirmed the ‘‘apparently universal struc-
ture in the representation of world history,
characterized by a focus on politics and war,
sociocentrically projected from the present to the
past’’ (Liu et al., 2009, p. 687) and were anchored
by the World Wars, 9/11, colonialism and the
struggle for freedom and independence in Africa.
STUDY 2
To ascertain if the kind of content found in Study
1 was contingent on the methods used, an
alternative set of three eliciting questions was
used in the second study with a broader set of
nations, allowing also an exploration of the
influence pertaining to two different historical–
cultural contexts: former Belgian and former
Portuguese colonies. In this study, conducted in
five African countries, a new open-ended method
allowed participants to write complete and com-
plex sentences to produce an overall narrative
rather than just listing discrete events and people.
Three questions, concerning the beginning, middle,
and future of world history, were used to examine
whether different questions might reveal different
content in terms of historical narratives.
Besides the hypotheses mentioned for Study 1,
we expected that:
H4: The predominant narratives would vary
depending on the eliciting question. We assumed
that using a question about beginnings would
elicit narratives concerned with the evolutionary
origins of humanity coming out of Africa, putting
Africans in a more central position in the story.
We also aimed to explore possible differences
according to the countries’ historical context; i.e.,
we surmised that a colonial/liberation narrative
would be more predominant in former Portuguese
than former Belgium colonies, since the decoloni-
zation process was slower, more violent, and more
recent than in the former Belgian colonies.
Method
Participants
A total of 865 university students—in various
disciplines, except history—from five African
countries participated in the study: Angola, Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau (using Portuguese),
Burundi, and Congo (using French), Portuguese
and French being respectively the standard lan-
guages of instruction at their universities.
Participants who did not answer any of the
open-ended questions of interest were discarded
(4 Angolans, 7 Cape Verdeans, 4 Guineans, 18
Congolese, and 9 Burundians). The final dataset
included 822 participants: 180 Angolans
(43.3% female; age M¼ 21.07, SD¼ 4.21); 186
Burundians (46.2% female; age M¼ 24.58,
SD¼ 3.09); 124 Cape Verdeans (61.3% female;
age M¼ 24.63, SD¼ 5.83); 162 Congolese (26.5%
female; age M¼ 28.64, SD¼ 8.51); and 170
Guineans (24.1% female; age M¼ 26.56,
SD¼ 6.21). Those are nonprobabilistic samples
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and cannot be considered as representative of the
whole populations of their respective countries.
Procedure
Participants were recruited in university class-
rooms and asked to voluntarily participate in a
study about world history. After some socio-
demographic questions, the cover page of the
survey ended with three open-ended historical
narrative questions: (1) If you had to tell the
story of world history, how would you begin? (2)
What do you think happened in history that was
most important to bring us to the current state of
the world? (3) What sort of future do you foresee
for the world? Each question was followed by a
blank space, allowing the participant to freely
write several sentences.
Coding scheme
Participants typically wrote a sentence or two in
response to each question. Following an adapta-
tion of Liu et al.’s (2005) coding scheme, responses
were coded into one of the following categories:
(1) evolution, (2) religion, (3) wars and conflicts,
(4) peace and cooperation, (5) culture and society,
(6) technology, (7) colonization, (8) political,
(9) environmental concerns, (10) economic issues,
(11) others (instructions available on request).
Multinomial analysis of variance using a max-
imum likelihood chi-square test statistic was
employed on these categorical data (Woodward,
Bonnett, & Brecht, 1990). We also performed a
correspondence analysis using the software Tri-
deux 5.0 (Cibois, 2006) to examine the associations
between occurrences of the content categories in
each of the three eliciting questions.
Results and discussion
Beginning the narration of world history
When participants were asked how they would
begin ‘‘the story of the world’’ (Q1) references to
evolution were more frequent than references
to war and conflict, w2(1)¼ 7.57, p5 .01. The
most frequent open-ended responses in this cate-
gory were references to the ‘‘evolution of human-
ity’’ (Table 2). Examples of these answers1 were:
. ‘‘I would start by the African continent, where
the first men were born’’ (Angolan/1)
. ‘‘Evolution of humankind and first tribes’’
(Guinean/49)
. ‘‘The origin of humankind and the way of life
of primitive men’’ (Cape Verdean/2)
. ‘‘I would start by the cradle of humanity that
is Africa’’ (Congolese/67)
. ‘‘I would start the history of Man, where he
came from, how he multiplied and formed
societies that could be antagonistic’’
(Burundian/64)
Warfare was the second most frequent narra-
tive beginning—with the First World War (WWI)
and Second World War (WWII) topping the
nominations—but this was more frequent in the
former Portuguese colonies (Angola, Cape Verde,
and Guinea-Bissau) than in the former Belgian
ones, w2(1)¼ 120.06, p5 .001. One can only
speculate on the reasons for this difference. The
long liberation wars in Angola and Guinea-Bissau
leading to independence could account for the
salience of this theme. Congo and Burundi went
through even more recent episodes of violent
conflicts but, in contrast to Portuguese former
TABLE 2
Beginning a narration of world history
Beginning Categories % Angola Burundi Cape Verde Congo Guinea-Bissau Total
Evolution 22 47 21 36 9 28
Religion 2 12 5 22 6 10
Wars and conflicts 32 6 26 5 38 21
Peace and cooperation 1 0 3 1 1 1
Culture and society 9 18 2 9 4 9
Technology 9 1 9 3 11 6
Colonization 22 1 35 3 26 16
Political 3 2 5 1 4 3
Environmental 0 0 0 0 1 0
Economic issues 0 3 0 4 1 2
Others 0 2 0 3 0 1
Total N answers 180 171 131 141 172 795
Columns may not sum to 100% because participants could mention more than one event.
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colonies, these conflicts were not part of the origin
of their present-day nations (see Liu et al., 2009),
and are therefore not seen as a beginning.
The third most frequent category to start the
narrative was colonization. The most frequent
nominations in this category were issues related
to slavery, colonialism and independence of
African nations in general or their country in
particular:
. ‘‘I would start by talking about slavery,
colonization, independence, and then after the
independence’’ (Congolese/138)
. ‘‘Once upon a time in 1961 [independence]’’
(Burundian/45)
. ‘‘What is the beginning of everything, in my
opinion, is slavery and the triangular trade’’
(Guinean/13)
. ‘‘The liberation of Angola and the expulsion of
the Portuguese’’ (Angolan/69)
. ‘‘I would start by the race competition
from European countries to Africa’’
(Guinean/33).
Content pertaining to a colonial narrative was
the second most frequent category for Portuguese-
speaking countries, while in the French-speaking
countries there were almost no references to
colonial issues to begin the narrative,
w2(1)¼ 130.81, p5 .001. A possible explanation
for the preponderance of colonial narratives in the
Portuguese-speaking countries could again be the
fact that the decolonization process was very slow
and was achieved only after a long liberation war
(1961–1974), while in the former Belgian colonies
there was a rapid and mostly peaceful decoloniza-
tion process.
Historical transition to the present
Table 3 reports answers to the second question
(Q2): ‘‘What do you think happened in history
that was most important to bring us to the current
state of the world?’’ This question generated the
most similar pattern of responses among the five
countries, and replicated the general patterns
found by Liu et al. (2005, 2009). When thinking
about the transitions that help explain today,
participants evoked mainly wars, especially the
two World Wars.
Colonization was the second more important
category. References to slavery and the slave trade,
to the Berlin Conference (partitioning Africa
among European powers), and to independence
were the most frequent open-ended responses in
this category:
. ‘‘Abolition of the slave trade’’ (Angolan/21)
. ‘‘The Berlin Conference and the division of
Africa’’ (Guinean/61)
. ‘‘Our freedom in 1975 [independence]’’ (Cape
Verdean/57)
. ‘‘The independence of my country’’
(Burundian/46)
. ‘‘June 30th 1960, date of the independence’’
(Congolese/54).
Technology was the third most important
category. References to the Industrial Revolution,
advances in medicine, and the advent of new
information and communication technologies were
most frequent.
. ‘‘The most important event that lead us to the
present state of the world is the discovery of the
machine by Man (18th century)’’ (Congolese/5)
TABLE 3
Historical transition to the present
Middle Categories % Angola Burundi Cape Verde Congo Guinea-Bissau Total
Evolution 5 3 5 2 4 4
Religion 7 9 4 3 2 5
Wars and conflicts 27 33 15 44 34 31
Peace and cooperation 2 4 2 1 4 3
Culture and society 7 8 5 11 3 7
Technology 21 16 27 10 19 18
Colonization 24 22 26 11 23 21
Political 6 2 10 3 7 5
Environmental 1 0 1 0 0 0
Economic issues 1 2 2 10 5 4
Others 2 0 0 4 0 1
Total N answers 180 184 119 160 170 813
Columns may not sum to 100% because participants could mention more than one event.
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. ‘‘Invention of the printing press’’ (Burundian/
23)
. ‘‘The most important event is the advent of
new technologies of communication’’
(Guinean/95).
These results suggest that when thinking
about the most important events in world history
in general, people are implicitly thinking about
events with a causal impact on the present. In some
cases, the participants made the causal link
explicit:
. ‘‘The World War 2 that gave access to the
universal declaration of human rights’’
(Angolan/63)
. ‘‘The Industrial Revolution, with the advent of
steam power, decreased hard labor’’ (Angolan/
6)
. ‘‘Colonization that brought division’’
(Burundian/15).
Future foreseen
When answering the question ‘‘What sort of
future do you foresee for the world?’’ the most
frequent category was Peace and Cooperation:
. ‘‘That wars cease in the world, that there be
peace’’ (Burundian/23)
. ‘‘A future where friendship and dialogue
between states reign’’ (Congolese/3)
. ‘‘A world with more justice, more equitable
and humane, which promotes greater well-
being for all’’ (Cape Verdean/78)
. ‘‘All people will understand each other, a better
future’’ (Guinean/12)
. ‘‘A world without borders’’ (Cape Verdean/57)
. ‘‘There will be peace and everyone will live at
ease’’ (Angolan/48).
Curiously, Burundi and Congolese partici-
pants, whose present-day political situation is
more unstable and has a higher risk of collective
violence, had a more optimistic narrative of the
future. Participants seemed to project their aspira-
tions for the present into the future (Table 4).
The second most frequent category when
thinking about the future was warfare. Most of
the open-ended responses in this category
described a ‘‘third world war’’ and/or ‘‘complete
destruction’’ due to ‘‘extreme competitiveness,’’
‘‘excessive greed and ambition,’’ but also due to
the ‘‘lack of water for all.’’ Many participants
made statements that the third world war will be
a ‘‘water war.’’
The fourth most frequent category was
culture and society issues, containing mainly
references to changes in world power relations.
Some participants anticipated the maintenance of
Western world dominance (‘‘Europeans will con-
tinue to interfere in the affairs of African people’’)
but the majority mentioned shifts in world power:
‘‘end of the supremacy of the USA’’; ‘‘intellectual
supremacy of blacks over whites’’. References to
shifts in power relations were particularly pre-
valent in Angola: About 12% of the Angolan
participants anticipated that Angola would
become a world power in the future. This hope
can be grounded in the fact that the country, rich
in oil and diamonds, has experienced huge
economic growth since the end of civil war in 2002.
Improvements in sciences and technology
emerged as another important category of
responses giving hope for the future. References
to a ‘‘cure for AIDS’’ were among the most
TABLE 4
Future foreseen
Future categories % Angola Burundi Cape Verde Congo Guinea-Bissau Total
Evolution 1 1 1 1 1 1
Religion 7 3 2 4 1 4
Wars and conflicts 34 13 24 9 34 21
Peace and cooperation 11 50 11 49 21 29
Culture and society 11 10 11 20 5 11
Technology 3 9 18 9 14 10
Colonization 1 3 1 0 1 1
Political 3 3 3 5 5 4
Environmental 34 4 25 4 4 14
Economic issues 3 4 3 7 5 4
Others 1 2 5 3 3 2
Total N answers 185 182 129 177 159 832
Columns may not sum to 100% because participants could mention more than one event.
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frequent in this category. On the other hand,
references to environmental issues were part of a
more pessimistic narrative, with mentions of
climate change, natural catastrophes, and environ-
mental degradation, which eventually would bring
the ‘‘end of the world.’’
The question about the kind of scenarios
participants foresaw for the future produced the
most divergent results between countries. The
participants in the former Portuguese colonies
anticipated war and conflicts (a third world war,
water wars, etc.) and environmental degradation
(climate change, lack of water and other natural
resources) more often than those in the former
Belgian ones, w2(1)¼ 60.24, p5 .001 for wars and
w2(1)¼ 77.83, p5 .001 for environment.
Content categories according to eliciting
question
Overall results concerning the content categories
across the five countries according to the eliciting
question are in accordance with our hypotheses
(cf. totals of Tables 2, 3, and 4). Events related to
wars and conflicts were most frequently nominated
when participants thought about world history
(Hypothesis 2). However, the extent of the
predominance of warfare and conflicts depended
on the question cueing recall (Hypothesis 4).
Participants showed a stronger tendency to evoke
wars and conflicts when answering the middle
question about transition to the present. When
asked how they would begin the story of world
history, participants’ references to war and conflict
were less frequent than references to evolution.
The category on peace and cooperation received
very low percentages on questions about the past,
but this increased considerably when participants
were foreseeing the future.
To examine the relationship between the
content categories resulting from different eliciting
questions, we performed a correspondence analy-
sis. A matrix crossing the 10 content categories
(excluding nonresponses and ‘‘others’’) with the
three time periods defined by the eliciting ques-
tions (‘‘beginning,’’ ‘‘middle,’’ and ‘‘future’’) was
first constructed. Each cell of the matrix contained
the number of observations associated with this
crosstabulation of levels of the two variables,
thereby yielding a contingency table. As expected,
the observed frequencies deviated strongly from
independence, w2(18)¼ 1226, p5 .001, indicating
that the content categories were not equally
represented for each eliciting question
(Hypothesis 4). To summarize the origin of these
deviations, this table was subjected to a factorial
correspondence analysis using SPSS’s correspon-
dence function. This method (see Benzecri, 1992;
Cibois, 2009; Greenacre, 2007) is equivalent to a
principal components analysis (PCA) but applies
to categorical data. Rather than explaining corre-
lation patterns, it attempts to account for devia-
tions from independence in a contingency table
through orthogonal factors summarizing these
deviations.
This analysis yielded a strong first factor that
explained 75% of the inertia (equivalent to
‘‘variance’’ in PCA parlance). An important
aspect of this method is that both dimensions of
the original table (here the time period and content
categories) should be considered in relation to the
factors extracted. The position of each of the time
periods is represented in Table 5, and the position
of the 10 content categories is presented in Table 6.
With respect to the time period, we find that the
first factor contrasted the ‘‘future’’ (associated
with the positive pole; see first column of Table 5)
with the ‘‘beginning’’ (associated with the negative
pole). With respect to the content categories, it
opposed the evolution and colonization categories
(typically used in the ‘‘beginning’’ question) on its
negative pole to environmental concerns and peace
and cooperation (typically used in the future) on
its positive pole (see first column of Table 6).
A second factor explained the remaining 25%
of the inertia. With respect to the ‘‘time’’ question,
it opposed the ‘‘middle’’ category to the two other
categories (see right-hand part of Table 5). In
terms of content, it mainly opposed technology
and to a lesser extent colonization and economy
(typically used in the ‘‘middle’’ question) to the
category primarily used in the beginning, evolution
of humanity.
TABLE 5
Relative positions of the three time periods on the factor
correspondence analysis
Time
Factor
Inertia
I II
F* Mass** F* Mass**
Beginning –0.76 0.31 0.62 0.36 0.15
Middle –0.33 0.06 –0.79 0.60 0.09
Future 1.05 0.63 0.18 0.03 0.23
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.47
*Reflects the position of the Time period on the Axis
(equivalent to ‘‘factor score’’ in PCA). **Reflects the contribu-
tion of the time period to the factor (i.e., the extent to which
each time period contributes to defining the factor).
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Figure 1, which plots the position of each
period and content category on the two factors
(labeled ‘‘Dimension 1’’ and ‘‘Dimension 2’’),
presents a graphical representation of this analysis.
One can detect the co-occurrence of levels of
different variables (here time and content cate-
gory) visually by inspecting the difference in the
angle they form with the origin (Cibois, 2009). A
90 angle indicates perfect independence whereas
acute and obtuse angles would suggest a positive
and a negative interdependence, respectively.
According to this logic, three large clusters can
be identified on the graph as a function of the time
period. One (upper left quadrant) associates the
beginning with evolution and (to a lesser extent)
religion. A second set associates the middle period
with technology, colonization, war and conflict,
and economy (lower part of the graph), and the
third associates the future with peace and coopera-
tion, and environmental concerns (upper right
quadrant).
We also examined whether there was an
association between the five countries and this
factor structure by entering country as a supple-
mentary variable.2 This analysis showed that
participants did not exhibit specific associations
with these two factors as a function of their
nationality: The factor scores were all negligible.
Note that this outcome is not incompatible with
the existence of dependences between specific
countries and particular levels of the categories
Figure 1. Graphic representation of the two factors of the correspondence analysis.
TABLE 6
Relative positions of the 10 content categories on the factor
correspondence analysis
Content
Factor
Inertia
I II
F* Mass** F* Mass**
Evolution –1.10 0.22 1.25 0.50 0.14
Religion –0.45 0.02 0.36 0.02 0.01
War –0.09 0.00 –0.31 0.07 0.01
Peace 1.46 0.38 0.36 0.04 0.15
Culture 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.00
Technology 0.00 0.00 –0.71 0.17 0.02
Colonization –0.79 0.13 –0.50 0.09 0.06
Political 0.07 0.00 –0.42 0.02 0.00
Environment 1.63 0.23 0.53 0.04 0.09
Economic 0.33 0.01 –0.30 0.01 0.00
Total 0.49
*Reflects the position of the content category on the factor.
**Reflects the contribution of the 10 content categories to each
factor (i.e., the extent to which each content category
contributes to defining the factor).
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but indicates that these are orthogonal to the
factor structure describing the present matrix.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Social representations of world history were
analyzed in two studies using qualitative data
involving university students from six sub-Saharan
African countries. Study 1 showed that nomina-
tions from Cape Verde and Mozambique for the
most important events in world history in the past
1000 years were dominated by war and politics,
recency effects, and Western-centrism tempered by
Afro-centrism surrounding colonization and inde-
pendence. These patterns replicated previous
research for the most part, but themes of human
rights and struggle for freedom and independence,
as well as those of colonization and slavery, were
more salient than in European and Asian data (Liu
et al., 2005, 2009).
Study 2 employed a novel method of asking
participants how they would begin the narration of
world history (Q1), to describe a past event that
shaped the present (Q2), and then foresee the
future (Q3). Different eliciting questions triggered
somewhat different narratives, but the one
anchored in war (mainly the WWI and WWII)
was strong regardless of the eliciting question.
Besides replication of the war and politics
narrative, a new narrative of the evolution of
humanity emerged using the new eliciting ques-
tions. Three main clusters were found: one
associates the ‘‘beginning’’ with evolution and
religion (to a lesser extent); a second associates the
‘‘middle’’ period of transition to the current
situation with technology, colonization, war and
conflict, and economics; and a third factor
associates the future with peace and cooperation,
and environmental concerns.
The need for closure and the ‘‘moralizing’’
impulse of the narrative (Wertsch, 2002) were
also visible; sometimes participants expressed this
explicitly, as when an Angolan began his narration
with the ‘‘Arrival of Portuguese in Angola’’ (Q1),
transitioned to the present by the ‘‘slave trade’’
(Q2), and foresaw a shift in world power—a
reversal whereby ‘‘the current powers will be the
most needy countries, because they are badly using
their resources and discoveries’’ (Q3).
When asked about how they foresaw the future,
most of the participants expressed hope for peace
and cooperation, while a significant minority had
a more pessimistic vision shaped by war and
conflicts or environmental degradation. It was
surprising that participants from war torn states
had more optimistic views of the future. These
‘‘positive illusions’’ (Taylor & Brown, 1988) might
be a coping mechanism for difficult times.
As we expected, colonial/liberation emerged as
a major narrative. This was particularly evident in
former Portuguese colonies, probably because the
decolonization process was slower, more violent,
and more recent than in the former Belgian
colonies. Differences between the former
Portuguese and former Belgian colonies demand
further exploration.
As mentioned above, colonial/liberation issues
were highly salient in both studies, contrasting
sharply with the previous results obtained in
former European colonial powers. While
Europeans tend to ‘‘forget’’ the dark side of
colonization when thinking about world history,
Africans render it salient. In both cases, forgetting
or remembering it serves identity protection
functions.
Several recent studies have shown the pervasive-
ness of the undermining effects of colonial
processes in the formation of mentalities and on
the shaping of present-day intergroup relations
and stereotypes content (e.g., Volpato & Licata,
2010). The long-term oppressive effects of coloni-
alism are often underestimated in social psycholo-
gical research, contributing to its pervasiveness. By
rendering salient a colonial narrative, the partici-
pants acknowledge its effects in the present-day
situation. Further research could investigate the
relation of representations of world history and the
attitudes towards reparation actions for histori-
cally disadvantaged groups.
Finally, a major limitation of the current
research is that, while it provides insight into the
representations of elite, university-educated parti-
cipants, it cannot be generalized to the less
educated, less fortunate majorities in sub-
Saharan Africa. While it is true that politics in
Africa, as in most developing societies, is elite-
driven, future research should investigate historical
representations of people with different socio-
economic and educational backgrounds. This is
easier said than done, and would require different
methods. Getting samples from non-Anglophone
sub-Saharan Africa was a daunting task even for
our research. The participants in this research were
not used to answering surveys and were not
familiar with quantitative scales, so we opted for
open-ended measures. For most, it was their first
participation in empirical research and opportu-
nity to voice their opinions.
Except Cape Verde, all countries in this research
are facing extreme poverty and are among the ones
with the lowest levels of human development in the
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world. Even if participants were members of an
elite, they would have experienced shortages in
‘‘basic’’ things that are taken-for-granted in devel-
oped societies. These young adults had hope for
the future. In their own words, they foresaw for
the future a world with ‘‘peace and where everyone
will live at ease,’’ ‘‘the end of poverty,’’ ‘‘electricity
and water channels in all villages,’’ ‘‘no more poor
or illiterate in the world,’’ and ‘‘a world where
feasting would be a habit.’’ This shows how
objective conditions can shape visions of history
and the future, an issue that also deserves further
research.
African perspectives are almost absent from the
current psychological literature, which is
‘‘reflective of the historically unequal intercultural
exchanges between Western and African cultural
heritages and in favour of the former. A greater
representation of the African experience in the
psychological literature could add to the richness
and global relevance of psychology’’ (Mpofu,
2002, p. 179). We hope we have contributed a
little to this growing richness in crosscultural
research.
NOTES
1. Information in parentheses indicates the nationality
and the identification number of the participant.
2. This was done in the software Tri-Deux (Cibois,
2006) since SPSS does not allow this possibility. It
involves computing a Burt contingency table cross-
ing all modalities of the three variables with each
other (Cibois, 2009). The resulting factor structure
is similar.
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